The capability approach: insights for a new poverty focus by Hick, Rod
Journal of Social Policy
http://journals.cambridge.org/JSP
Additional services for Journal of Social Policy:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
The Capability Approach: Insights for a New
Poverty Focus
ROD HICK
Journal of Social Policy / Volume 41 / Issue 02 / April 2012, pp 291 - 308
DOI: 10.1017/S0047279411000845, Published online: 21 December 2011
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0047279411000845
How to cite this article:
ROD HICK (2012). The Capability Approach: Insights for a New Poverty Focus.
Journal of Social Policy, 41, pp 291-308 doi:10.1017/S0047279411000845
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/JSP, IP address: 131.251.254.13 on 25 Feb 2014
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Feb 2014 IP address: 131.251.254.13
Jnl Soc. Pol. (2012), 41, 2, 291–308 C© Cambridge University Press 2011
doi:10.1017/S0047279411000845
The Capability Approach: Insights
for a New Poverty Focus
ROD HICK
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London School of Economics and Political Science,
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
email: w.r.hick@lse.ac.uk
Abstract
The concepts of poverty, social exclusion and deprivation are widely employed but often
problematic. This paper discusses some problems with prominent interpretations of these
concepts and how Amartya Sen’s capability approach can provide a conceptual framework that
can overcome these problems. It is argued that the capability approach can reflect the many
ways that human lives are blighted and that it thus offers a promising framework for poverty
analysis. Six insights for poverty analysis provided by the capability approach are discussed.
Introduction
A framework for poverty analysis must seek to reflect societal change and
economic shocks, such as the current crisis, in distinctly human terms. For this,
we need the right concepts and measures. In this paper, we discuss some problems
associated with existing approaches to conceptualising poverty, social exclusion
and deprivation, and discuss the contribution that the capability approach might
offer in resolving them. It is argued that the capability approach can provide a
framework that can reflect the many ways in which human lives can be blighted,
and which thus offers some promise for poverty analysis.
This may come as some surprise to those familiar with the exchange between
Sen and Peter Townsend in the 1980s (Sen, 1983, 1985; Townsend, 1985), which did
little to endear the social policy community to Sen’s approach. However, there are
at least two reasons why it is timely to reconsider the potential of the capability
approach. First, in the years since the Sen−Townsend debate, the capability
approach has become much more prominent. It has provided the conceptual
underpinning for the UN’s Human Development Reports (UNDP, 2010), has
influenced the understanding of well-being in the recent ‘Sarkozy Commission’
(Stiglitz et al., 2009) and has been the basis for the Equality and Human Rights
Commission’s approach to monitoring equality in the UK (Burchardt and Vizard,
2011). Given this increased prominence, we might ask whether some advantages
of the approach have been overlooked.
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Second, there is, at present, an unresolved tension within poverty analysis
between a desire to emphasise a broad measure of multidimensional poverty
(e.g. Atkinson et al., 2002: 79) and an insistence on conceptualising poverty in
narrower terms around a core concept of resources (e.g. Nolan and Whelan, 1996).
One of the functions of the concept of social exclusion was to cover important
additional terrain beyond the concept of poverty (e.g. Room, 1995). However, the
lack of progress in identifying what is meant by social exclusion not only raises
questions about its suitability as a concept, but also places this additional terrain
in jeopardy. It will be argued that the capability approach offers a way to reconcile
this tension between narrow and broad conceptions of poverty, by respecting the
former without losing sight of the latter.
The purpose of the paper is to examine the conceptual contribution the
approach might make to the analysis of poverty in a developed nation, social
policy context, and it is the literature in this field that the paper both draws
on and seeks to contribute to. As will hopefully become clear, the approach
is not a distinct field of study (‘capability studies’), but is, rather, a lens with
which to view our existing concerns – in this case, the problem of poverty.
This paper examines the original justifications for contemporary approaches to
poverty analysis within social policy so that the distinctiveness of the capability
approach, and the contribution it might make in this field, can be identified.
A wider approach, drawing on literature from other disciplines, or contrasting
concepts of poverty employed in developing and developed contexts, would
also be of interest, but is beyond the scope of the present paper. While the
focus of the paper is primary conceptual, in the penultimate section some
empirical applications of the approach are discussed and some implications
for adopting a capability framework are considered. The paper concludes by
presenting six insights that the capability approach can provide for poverty
analysis.
The capability approach and resource-based approaches
to poverty analysis
The capability approach focusses on what people are able to do and be, as opposed
to what they have, or how they feel. Sen argues that, in analysing well-being, we
should shift our focus from ‘the means of living’, such as income, to the ‘actual
opportunities a person has’, namely their functionings and capabilities (Sen,
2009: 253). ‘Functionings’ refer to the various things a person succeeds in ‘doing
or being’, such as participating in the life of society, being healthy and so forth,
while ‘capabilities’ refer to a person’s real or substantive freedom to achieve such
functionings; for example, the ability to take part in the life of society (Sen, 1999:
75). Of crucial importance is the emphasis on real or substantive – as opposed to
formal – freedom, since capabilities are opportunities that one could exercise if
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so desired. The capability approach places particular emphasis on the capabilities
a person has, irrespective of whether they choose to exercise these or not.
Sen’s first exposition of the approach came in ‘Equality of what?’ (1982); a
paper whose title reflects his emphasis on identifying on what ‘moral information’
considerations of equality, poverty, justice, etc. should be based. In the capability
approach, the selection of functionings and capabilities as the ‘informational
space’ of analysis is made prior to identifying the precise context of analysis
(e.g. analysing poverty, justice, etc.). This priority is what we will call the
‘normative focus’ of the capability approach. It can be contrasted with what
we can call a ‘conceptual focus’, which might first decide on the context, asking
‘what is poverty?’, prior to determining the informational space of analysis (e.g.
whether to measure poverty using income, consumption, opportunities, etc.).
Both questions must, of course, be addressed, but the order in which they are
addressed may differ.
From a capability perspective, poverty is viewed as the deprivation of
certain basic capabilities, and these can vary, as Sen has argued, ‘from such
elementary physical ones as being well nourished, being adequately clothed and
sheltered, avoiding preventable morbidity, and so forth, to more complex social
achievements such as taking part in the life of the community, being able to
appear in public without shame, and so on’ (Sen, 1995: 15). There is no suggestion,
as is sometimes claimed, that the capabilities concerned should be determined
without reference to prevailing living standards; indeed, Sen has been clear that
such standards will influence the selection of relevant capabilities (e.g. Sen, 1984:
84–5).
The capability approach questions the central role often afforded to
income in poverty measurement. Sen draws a distinction between the actual
opportunities, or capabilities, a person has, which he argues are intrinsically
important, and their income, which is merely a means to such opportunities, and
whose importance is thus both instrumental and contingent (Sen, 2009: 233).
This relates to the distinction between direct and indirect concepts of poverty
drawn by Ringen (1988). Direct concepts of poverty focus on cases where living
standards fall below a certain level, and typically assume that this is because of
a lack of resources. Indirect concepts focus on cases where resources fall below
a certain point, and typically assume that this results in a low standard of living
(Ringen, 1988; Berthoud and Bryan, 2011).
Of course, such distinctions would be of little importance if low income
were a good proxy for deprivation. But the capability approach holds that this is
unlikely to be the case: people have varying needs and will thus require different
levels of resources in order to achieve the same standard of living. For example,
the additional costs associated with disability might mean that a disabled person
requires a greater amount of resources to achieve the same standard of living as
an able-bodied person (Sen, 2009). Sen uses the term ‘conversion factors’ to refer
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to this variability in translating resources (or means) into capabilities (or ends).
And while he discusses such conversion factors primarily in theoretical terms,
the mismatch between indirect and direct measures of poverty has been one of
the primary empirical findings from poverty analysis in the field of social policy
in recent decades (see, inter alia, Gordon et al. 2000; Bradshaw and Finch, 2003).
In prioritising the intrinsic importance of what people can do or be over
the resources they possess, the capability approach is unambiguous in favouring
a direct approach to poverty analysis. However, there is a strong tradition of
direct conceptualisation of poverty, social exclusion and deprivation in the field
of social policy which can also claim to focus on what people are able to do and
be; for example, whether they can participate in the life of society (e.g. Townsend,
1979). Is the capability approach effectively equivalent to these traditions and, if
not, how does it differ? It is to these questions that we turn.
The direct tradition of poverty analysis
In Poverty in the United Kingdom, Peter Townsend pioneered the use of
deprivation indicators as a method of tapping into the prevailing style of living
in the UK. Townsend’s influential definition of poverty was:
Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they
lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living
conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in
the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by
the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns,
customs and activities. (1979: 31)
Townsend provided two sets of deprivation indicators: a list of sixty indicators
measuring ‘styles of living’ and a summary deprivation index of twelve items
drawn from this longer list, which would be used to calibrate an income poverty
line. The longer sixty-indicator list was intended to examine the full range of living
conditions that were ‘customary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in
the societies in which they belong’ (1979: 31). Indeed, this breadth was stressed by
Townsend himself, who noted that ‘[i]n principle, such a list might be developed
. . . from an exhaustive analysis of the amenities available to, and the customs or
modes of living of, a majority of the population’ (1979: 251).
While an exhaustive list may always prove elusive, Townsend noted that
he sought ‘to ensure that all the major areas of personal, household and social
life were represented’ in the questionnaire (1979: 251). The breadth of the sixty
indicators was indeed impressive: six items relating to dietary deprivation, four
to clothing, four to fuel and light, nine relating to household facilities, four to
household conditions and amenities, twelve to conditions at work, five to health,
one to education, five relating to environmental deprivation, four relating to the
family, two to recreational activities and four to social activities.
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We are not told a great deal about the process of reducing these sixty
indicators into a more manageable summary index of twelve items other than
that there was a desire to select ‘those indicators which apply to the whole
population’ (1979: 251) rather than to specific groups. However, this process is of
some interest, because the resulting summary index was in no way representative
of the breadth of the original list. Not a single item relating to conditions at work,
health, education, environmental deprivation, fuel and light and clothing was
included in the summary deprivation index, which was a subset of the longer list
not only in length but also in scope and reflected a narrower concept of poverty
than the full sixty-item set.
The most influential critique of Townsend’s work came from Piachaud
(1981) who questioned the implicit relationship between the absence of items
on Townsend’s deprivation index and poverty. Piachaud (1981: 420) noted that
going without the items then might be ‘as much to do with tastes as with poverty’.
Rather than assuming non-possession or non-consumption implied deprivation,
Piachaud argued ‘[w]hat surely matters most is the choice a person has, and the
constraints he or she faces. To choose not to go on holiday or eat meat it one
thing: it may interest sociologists, but it is of no interest to those concerned with
poverty. To have little or no opportunity to take a holiday or buy meat is entirely
different’ (Piachaud, 1981: 421). It is important to note at this point the close
parallel between Piachaud’s critique of Townsend and Sen’s distinction between
functionings and capabilities (and his priority of the latter). Both emphasise the
importance of constraints for the conceptualisation of poverty.
Mack and Lansley’s (1985) subsequent Poor Britain survey, which built on
the work of Townsend, defined poverty as an ‘enforced lack of socially perceived
necessities’ and sought to establish the public’s view on ‘what it is that people
need for living in Britain in the 1980s’ (1985: 9). They accepted Piachaud’s (1981)
critique, and those who reported the absence of particular deprivation items were
subsequently asked whether this was by choice or because they could not afford
them, thus seeking to distinguish between choice and constraint. This second
question not only shifted the focus from the absence of items to an enforced
absence due to a lack of resources, however, but also influenced the selection of
indicators:
The critical role of lack of resources to the concept of poverty also has wider implications,
because it determines which aspects of our way of life should be included in a minimum
standard of living aimed at measuring poverty. We decided that only those aspects of life
facilitated by access to money should be tested in the Breadline Britain survey. (Mack and
Lansley, 1985: 44)
They noted that health, education, conditions at work and environmental
factors all affected an individual’s quality of life, ‘but they are not in the main paid
for’ and were thus excluded (Mack and Lansley (1985: 44–5). Subsequent studies
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have continued broadly in this vein, focussing on this narrow concept of poverty
(or ‘material deprivation’) (e.g. Gordon and Pantazis, 1997; Gordon et al., 2000),
which bears a greater resemblance to Townsend’s twelve-item summary index
than his broader sixty-item list.
The direct tradition of poverty analysis and the capability approach
This narrow approach to conceptualising poverty – as ‘exclusion from the
life of the society owing to a lack of resources’ (Nolan and Whelan, 1996: 2) –
has become enormously influential in recent decades and the indicators used in
this approach, as we have seen, are typically justified by their responsiveness to
resources. But from a normative perspective, this justification can be questioned,
because the ability to participate in the life of society, for example, does not derive
its importance from its relationship to resources.
There is no reason, from a normative perspective, why the important
dimensions for analysis should be decided by their anticipated responsiveness to
resources, and the capability approach, which adopts such a perspective, would
offer a considerably broader focus than the direct tradition of poverty analysis. It
allows us to consider dimensions such as health, housing deprivation, conditions
at work and so forth, which often sit uneasily with existing concepts of poverty
and may be relegated to ‘causes’ or ‘consequences’ of poverty or dropped from
analysis entirely.
In terms of the shared emphasis on constraints, there is some resemblance
between Sen’s distinction between functionings and capabilities and Piachaud’s
insistence that the mere absence of deprivation items cannot straightforwardly
be interpreted as implying poverty. For both, poverty must be distinguished
from preference. Subsequent surveys have – to this day – responded to
Piachaud’s critique by asking not only whether deprivation items are absent,
but, where they are, asking whether this is because of a lack of resources.
However, this has created a false dichotomy whereby the absence of items
for reasons other than a lack of resources is typically attributed to ’choice’.
Other constraints that might impede participating in the life of society, such
as disability, discrimination or geographical isolation, inter alia, are simply
overlooked.
It is incongruous, however, to argue that something is of serious concern if
one is deprived of it because of a lack of resources but of little or no concern
if as a result of other constraints. Seen in this light, Piachaud’s critique raised
the right question, but received the wrong answer. The concept of capabilities,
on the other hand, considers all potential constraints to well-being achievement,
whether this is a lack of resources, disability, discrimination, etc. The capability
approach thus takes a broader approach to both the dimensions of interest and
the constraints considered than direct approaches to poverty analysis.
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The concept of social exclusion
The concept of social exclusion has received substantial attention in recent years,
often as a concept allied to that of poverty. The distinction between the two is
often said to lie in the multidimensional, dynamic nature of social exclusion,
which is supposed to contrast with the static, unidimensional concept of poverty.
One of the challenges in locating the social exclusion concept with respect to
the capability approach, however, is the extremely contested nature of the social
exclusion concept (de Haan, 1998; Levitas, 1998). There might be widespread
agreement on the need to fight exclusion, but ‘fighting exclusion means different
things to different people’ (Silver, 1994: 544).
The initial usage of the term ‘social exclusion’ is typically attributed to
Rene´ Lenoir who, in the 1970s, employed the term ‘les exclus’ to refer to those
who were falling through France’s insurance-based social security programmes.
This included ‘the mentally and physically handicapped, suicidal people, aged
invalids, abused children, drug addicts, delinquents, single parents, multi-
problem households, marginal, asocial persons, and other “social misfits”’ (Silver,
1994: 532). While many of these groups may indeed be vulnerable, such a
conceptualisation was derived from French Republican ideology which stressed
the importance of social cohesion.
While this conceptualisation of social exclusion focussed on social rights
(see also Room, 1995: 243), an alternative conceptualisation focusses on
multidimensional and dynamic exclusion from a certain standard of living in
economic, political, cultural and social dimensions (Burchardt et al., 2002;
Stewart et al., 2007). In terms of the causes of exclusion, there is widespread
agreement that social exclusion considers a broader range of constraints than a
‘lack of resources’ (Evans, 1998; de Haan, 1998), and Stewart et al. (2007) argue
that the concept allows for a focus not only on individuals, but also on groups
where group-membership itself is a cause of exclusion – for example, on the basis
of ethnicity or caste.
Room (1995: 233–4) has suggested that the shift from income poverty to social
exclusion entails a broadening of focus on three fronts – from income/expenditure
to multidimensional disadvantage; from static outcomes to dynamic processes;
and from a focus on the individual or household to the local community.
However, while these may be features of a social exclusion approach, the extent
to which they are distinctions has been questioned (Burchardt et al., 2002;
Gordon, 2006). Nonetheless, the concept of social exclusion is often presented as
a companion to the concept of poverty in order to consider a broader conceptual
terrain.
However, what remains contested is the very core of the concept – what
it is we want the concept to do. The answers to two important questions lack
sufficient clarity, and the implications of these answers are seldom considered.
First, is social exclusion an outcome or a process? While the dynamic nature of
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social exclusion is often professed as an advantage, and, indeed, a feature which
distinguishes the concept from the capability approach (Stewart et al., 2007),
there is a crucial distinction between adopting a dynamic perspective and an
approach focussing on a process. For example, Room (1995: 237) notes that ‘[i]t is
not enough to count the numbers and describe the characteristics of the socially
excluded; it is also necessary to understand and monitor the process of social
exclusion and to identify the factors that can trigger entry or exit from situations
of exclusion’. Here exclusion is presented as an outcome, although our focus may
be on its causes. Elsewhere, however, he notes ‘[s]ocial exclusion is the process
of becoming detached from the organisations and communities of which the
society is composed and from the rights and obligations that they embody’ (1995:
243). Here, social exclusion is itself presented as a process.
However, these two conceptions are distinct. In the first – as outcome – we
identify a group (the excluded) and, ex post, observe the risk factors that predict
their exclusion. In the second – as process – it is the risk factors themselves that
are of interest, irrespective of whether the related outcomes, in fact, occurred. As
we will see, this lack of conceptual clarity is mirrored in terms of measurement.
The second question is: for whom is social exclusion bad? Is it bad for those
afflicted by it, preventing them living as they themselves would like? If so, we may
be interested solely in exclusions which are the product of constraints. Or it is
bad for society as a whole due to, for example, a breakdown in social cohesion?
If this is the case, then we may be justified in focussing on both voluntary
and involuntary social exclusion. Barry (2002) argues that voluntary exclusion
should be included in the concept, noting that seemingly voluntary withdrawal
may obscure exclusionary processes, and that social solidarity may be required
to promote individual well-being and achieve social justice.
Attempts to distinguish between choice and constraint are not always
clear-cut and the concern that seemingly voluntary withdrawal may overlook
exclusionary processes is a legitimate one. However, this does not challenge the
primary theoretical focus on constraints. Furthermore, greater solidarity may
indeed improve prospects for individual well-being and social justice, but to
include solidarity in the concept of social exclusion is to confuse a particular
strategy for preventing exclusion with its very nature. Voluntary exclusion may,
thus, be bad for society, but it is not clear why we should unambiguously accept
it is bad for individuals themselves.
Measuring social exclusion
That there is little agreement about how to measure social exclusion may
come as no surprise given the varied interpretations of the concept. Indeed, the
conceptual ambiguity relating to the two questions discussed above is reflected
directly at the level of measurement. There is an important distinction between a
measure or indicator and a risk factor, which is related to whether social exclusion
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is seen as an outcome or a process. Levitas (2000: 369–73) has been critical of the
use of certain indicators of social exclusion such as whether one smokes, or one’s
parents are divorced or, amongst working-age adults, whether one contributes to
a private pension scheme, noting, as regards the latter, that while non-provision
during one’s working life may lead to future exclusion, it says nothing about
one’s current circumstances (2000: 376). The lack of clarity about whether social
exclusion is an outcome or a process is thus reflected in the indicators used to
measure the concept.
Furthermore, indicators of social exclusion often relate to (voluntary)
disengagement and not (involuntary) exclusion per se, reflecting confusion about
whom social exclusion is bad for. The influential Poverty and Social Exclusion
survey noted that civic disengagement could be considered to be a component
of social exclusion. The study included as indicators of social exclusion whether
people voted in the last general election, helped on fundraising issues, urged
others to vote, contacted a local councillor or urged some else to do so, acted as
an officer of an organisation or club, made a speech before an organised group,
had written a letter to an editor, actively participated in a political campaign or
stood for public office (Gordon et al., 2000: 66). Others have used indicators such
as how often respondents meet with friends or talk to neighbours, or whether they
are members of a sports club or political party (Tsakloglou and Papadopoulos,
2002). Not one of these indicators survives Piachaud’s critique that our focus
should be on constraints and not choices, a principle which is now part of the
received wisdom when measuring poverty but which remains strangely neglected
with respect to social exclusion.
Social exclusion and the capability approach
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to considering the relationship between the
capability approach and the concept of social exclusion is the plurality of
interpretations of the latter. It can, in fact, be questioned whether ‘social exclusion’
is really an academic concept at all, or whether it is merely a rhetorical device,
laden with negative connotations but devoid of any shared meaning.
If social exclusion is primarily bad for society, then voluntary social exclusion
may be evidence of a lack of social cohesion. But this would imply that the concepts
of poverty and social exclusion are uneasy companions – one relating to persons
and the other to society. If, on the other hand, social exclusion is bad for people
themselves, then there is good reason to believe that voluntary social exclusion
should not be included in the concept since there is nothing very ‘exclusionary’
about not having written a letter to an editor, for example.
If the focus of the concept is solely on constraints, then social exclusion
would bear some resemblance to the concept of capabilities. Even then, one
presumes that, while both are inherently multidimensional (Stewart et al., 2007),
the concept of social exclusion must limit itself to dimensions of a ‘social’ nature
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(Sen, 2000) and thus it is not clear whether and how the social exclusion concept
could be used to tap into dimensions such as ill-health, time poverty and so forth.
From a normative perspective, the importance of particular dimensions is not
derived from, or limited by, the extent to which they are ‘social’.
Thus, the lack of clarity in the concept of social exclusion, despite its
ubiquitous usage, poses serious problems for analysis. Without considerable
theoretical advancement – and in a form that achieves at least some common
acceptance – the concept of social exclusion would seem to be considerably less
useful than it may, on first glance, appear. While the precise dimensionality of
both social exclusion and the capability approach is ambiguous (Stewart et al.,
2007), there is no reason why the capability approach must be limited to
‘social’ dimensions, and there are no ambiguities as regards whether capability
deprivation is an outcome or a process or of whom capability deprivation is
bad for. The capability approach thus provides a perspective which is both
broader than social exclusion in terms of dimensionality, and which possesses a
considerably firmer conceptual foundation.
The concept of deprivation
It is worth also considering the relationship between the capability approach
and two contrasting approaches to the concept of deprivation. The first, and
most common, approach is to use the concept of deprivation to refer to the
direct tradition of poverty analysis involving deprivation indicators (for example,
Saunders, 2004). The problem with this interpretation is that, on this view, the
concept of deprivation adds nothing to the direct conception of poverty, (as
material deprivation) which, as we have noted, is largely limited to commodities
and activities that reflect variations in resources.
The second concept of deprivation has an older – and broader – conceptual
pedigree. In Poverty in the United Kingdom (1979), Townsend offered a definition
of deprivation distinct to that of poverty: ‘[p]eople can be said to be deprived
if they lack the types of diet, clothing, housing, environmental, educational
working and social conditions, activities and facilities which are customary, or
at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong’
(1979: 413). The distinguishing features of Townsend’s concept of deprivation
are (i) the extension beyond resource-based dimensions and (ii) extension
beyond a lack of resources as the sole cause of deprivation. In this conception,
deprivation is viewed as being broader than poverty, and is conceptualised by
Townsend as ‘a state of observable and demonstrable disadvantage relative to
the local community or the wider society or nation to which an individual,
family or group belongs’ (Townsend, 1987: 125), with a focus on those who are
forced to lead ‘restricted or stunted social lives’ (1987: 128). There are, then, two
distinct concepts of deprivation, namely material deprivation (i.e. focussing on
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resource-based dimensions) and multiple deprivation (i.e., across a wide range of
dimensions), although this distinction is not always explicit within the literature.
Deprivation and the capability approach
There is some considerable similarity between the capability approach, with
its focus on removing barriers which force people ‘to live less or be less’ and
this second, broader conceptualisation of deprivation, focussing on ‘restricted
or stunted social lives’ (Townsend, 1987: 128). One important similarity is the
potential breadth of both approaches – a feature stressed by Townsend, who
noted that ‘the scientist must consider deprivation as the darker side of the entire
lifestyle of a people’ (Townsend, 1987: 129). And since a lack of resources is not
the sole reason for being deprived, one is no longer required to focus only on
deprivations that are responsive to variations in resources (Veit-Wilson, 1987).
The concept of deprivation is multidimensional; though, as with the
capability approach, the exact dimensionality remains to be specified. The
question of dimensionality is, we must note, an important one for all
multidimensional approaches, whether their focus is poverty, social exclusion,
deprivation or the capability approach. However, Nolan and Whelan (1996: 71)
argued that the question of choice and constraint was overlooked by Townsend,
and that the concept of deprivation should focus only on deprivations that are
enforced. If this were conceded, then the concept of deprivation would bear
important similarities to that of capability deprivation. It is not clear that this
is universally accepted, however, and Townsend (1987: 139) was not wrong when
he suggested that the concept of deprivation was ‘not yet being treated very
coherently’.
The capability approach offers a framework for poverty analysis which
prioritises capabilities (ends) over resources (means), adopts a multidimensional
perspective and takes a broad focus on the constraints that may restrict human
lives. It is argued here that the capability approach can provide additional
coherence to the concept of deprivation, not because the concept of capabilities
should replace that of deprivation, but because the concept of deprivation should
focus on people’s capabilities.
Operationalising the capability approach
While the focus of this paper is primarily conceptual, in this section we focus
on empirical applications of the capability approach – an important issue given
some doubts about whether the approach can be operationalised at all. Questions
regarding what the relevant dimensions should be, and by what process these
should be decided have loomed large in the capability literature. Sen himself has
famously refused to endorse a fixed list of capabilities, arguing for the importance
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of democratic debate in deciding the important dimensions (for example, Sen,
2009).
In the UK, Burchardt and Vizard (2011) have adopted such a deliberative
approach in their capability-based framework for monitoring equality and
human rights in England, Scotland and Wales. They drew on a ‘minimum core’ of
dimensions from existing human rights frameworks, and subsequently engaged
in deliberative consultation with the general public and with groups at risk of
discrimination and disadvantage in order to refine and expand on this core.
Their final list of dimensions covers life; physical security; health; education
and learning; standard of living; productive and valued activities; participation,
influence and voice; individual, family and social life; identity, expression, self-
respect; and legal security. This is undoubtedly a broad focus and is an important
example of a consultative process being used to determine a capability list, but
their indicators are not taken from any single data-set – a normal requirement for
poverty analysis in order to explore joint distributions and so forth. This points
to the demanding nature of requiring information about multiple dimensions of
deprivation to be collected from a single survey.
However, not all authors have pursued such a deliberative approach. Martha
Nussbaum (2000) has provided a list of ten, philosophically derived capabilities
that, she argues, all citizens have a right to demand from their governments.
These capabilities are life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination
and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and
control over one’s environment (2000). Anand and colleagues have attempted
to operationalise Nussbaum’s list of capabilities by fielding their own UK-based
survey (e.g. Anand et al., 2009), which, they suggest, demonstrates the ‘feasibility
although non-triviality’ of using the capability approach to support empirical
analysis.
Others have used the approach to motivate a concern with a range of
non-resource based capabilities. For example, Brandolini and d’Alessio (1998)
used the approach to support a multidimensional poverty analysis focussing
on health, education, employment, housing, social relationships and economic
resources; Kuklys (2005) focussed on outcomes in health and housing, while
Bonvin and Dif-Pradalier (2010) have emphasised the importance of the
capability for work and the capability for voice. Taken together, these studies
are welcome as they point both to the ability of the approach to support
empirical analysis and to extend the focus of such analysis beyond resource-
based dimensions such as material deprivation.
However, Robeyns (2005: 208, see also Robeyns and van der Veen, 2007)
has questioned whether it is useful to operationalise the approach by drawing
on Nussbaum’s capability list when engaging in comparative quality of life
assessment, since Nussbaum’s approach was intended to be a philosophical
account of constitutional entitlements. And this returns us to an important
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point – for the capability approach, as we have noted, specifies the ‘informational
space’ of analysis (functionings and capabilities) prior to identifying the specific
context of study (e.g. poverty analysis). But the relevant dimensions for any
particular analysis are likely to be highly context-dependent.
The capability approach is not a field of study (‘capability studies’), but is
a framework that can provide a lens for poverty analysis which emphasises its
normative or ethical dimension. It stresses the intrinsic importance of people’s
capabilities (as ends) as opposed to the instrumental importance of their incomes
(as means); argues for the importance of multidimensional assessment in poverty
analysis and adopts a broad perspective of the many kinds of constraints that can
limit people’s lives. This focus can help to ensure that the indicators employed
‘have a clear and accepted normative interpretation’ (Atkinson et al., 2002:
21), a desirable feature of any analysis. Thus, in a capability framework for
poverty analysis, the normative lens would come from the approach, while
the precise dimensionality would be decided contextually, with reference, inter
alia, to existing poverty research. Seen in this light, a capability framework can
contribute – in a practical way – to the growing focus on multiple deprivation
within social policy (e.g. Whelan et al., 2010).
At present, such a framework might be only partially operational
because of current limitations in existing datasets, and because the exact
dimensionality of the approach is under-determined. But this is true of all
multidimensional approaches, capability-inspired or otherwise, and unless more
limited approaches, such as the low income or material deprivation approach,
act as good proxies for multidimensional poverty and deprivation, then some
important information is lost by the omission of wider dimensions. Indeed,
establishing which important dimensions we cannot currently measure can be
of some practical good – see, for example, the work of Alkire and colleagues to
develop survey modules for ‘missing dimensions’ in multidimensional poverty
analysis for quality of work, agency and empowerment, physical safety, the ability
to avoid shame and psychological well-being (see Alkire, 2007 for an overview).
A more systematic approach to multidimensional analysis, drawing on the
capability approach, can help to ensure that appropriate indicators are employed
and can improve the coherence of analysis by minimising inclusion and exclusion
errors (to borrow a concept from a rather different setting; see Cornia and Stewart,
1993). Inclusion errors refer here to the inclusion of dimensions in empirical
analysis that do not fall within our conceptual framework; it is argued that
developing an explicit multidimensional framework can help to guard against
inclusion errors. Exclusion errors, on the other hand, refer to the failure to include
conceptually important dimensions in our empirical analysis, and may be at least
partially unavoidable where one is relying on secondary datasets. Nonetheless, as
we have noted, identifying which dimensions are ‘missing’ can be the first step
towards rectifying their omission.
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A capability framework for poverty analysis would provide the basis for
assessing social and economic changes, both within and between countries.
However, Dean (2009) has questioned whether the approach can provide an
adequate assessment of capitalist societies because, he argues, it ignores systemic
injustices created by capitalism itself, such as the exploitation of labour. Human
capabilities are the product of social relations and may be structurally unequal.
They are also in constant tension and conflict, since exercising my capabilities
may serve to limit those of others (2009: 273).
As an assessment framework, the approach does not, in itself, provide
a critique of capitalism, although a capability assessment should provide
information for such a critique to be constructed. In focussing on what people
can do and be (human ends) and not on their resources (means), and in focussing
on both monetary and non-monetary dimensions and constraints, the approach
can help to evaluate the outcomes of capitalist society in terms of the unequal
capabilities that result.
However, Dean is right to point to the interdependency of human capabilities
and to the questions of power and conflict that inevitably arise (see also Deneulin
and McGregor, 2010). While a focus on such interdependency has perhaps not
received the attention it deserves in the capability literature, it has not been entirely
neglected either – for example, Sen has discussed the systematic deprivation of
women’s capabilities in male-dominated societies (for example, 2009: 244–5).
The point, from a capability perspective, is that in assessing the extent to which
capitalism is commensurate with human development (Dean, 2009: 272), in
terms of both its outcomes and its processes, our evaluation should focus on
people’s capabilities.
The capability approach: insights for poverty analysis
The capability approach can provide a framework for poverty analysis that
overcomes some of the central problems with existing traditions of analysis. The
direct measurement of poverty has increasingly focussed on a narrow concept of
material poverty. This emphasis on resources as being the core of the poverty
concept has limited not only the constraints that are considered (solely a lack
of resources) but has also limited the indicators themselves to marketable items.
We have argued that the subdivision of constraints is normatively arbitrary
and the narrow measure that results ignores too much that should concern us
about the problem of poverty. While social exclusion is often seen as
complementing the concept of poverty, its lack of coherence renders it deeply
problematic. It remains unclear whether social exclusion is an outcome or a
process and for whom it is bad. This incoherence in terms of conceptualisation
is mirrored in measurement, where indicators of disengagement are routinely
interpreted as implying exclusion. Finally, the concept of deprivation, at least
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in its less popular but broader incarnation, can be seen to bear important
similarities with the concept of capability deprivation. However, the importance
of constraints to the concept of deprivation again lacks clarity, and, to be useful,
the concept requires greater coherence. It is argued here that the capability
approach can act as a framework for conceptualising poverty and deprivation.
The preceding discussion provides six important insights for poverty
analysis. First, the capability approach questions whether we can be neutral between
direct and indirect approaches to poverty analysis. In emphasising the intrinsic
importance of people’s capabilities over the merely instrumental importance of
their resources, the approach focusses on those who have impoverished lives, and
not just depleted wallets (Sen, 2000: 3).
Second, the concepts we employ – and not just that of poverty – should reflect
deprivations that are enforced and not voluntary non-participation. While on
the surface this may seem self-evident, it would rule inadmissible many of the
indicators used to measure social exclusion and would provide greater clarity to
the concept of multiple deprivation.
Third, a lack of resources cannot be the only constraint of interest for poverty
analysis. If we believe that the indicators we employ hold normative weight, then
it is a nonsense to suggest that their absence is of serious concern if because of a
lack of resources, but of no concern if as a result of other constraints (e.g. disability
or discrimination). The ability to participate in the life of society, for example,
does not derive its importance from its responsiveness to resources and nor, if we
believe it to be important, can a lack of resources be the only constraint we are
interested in, for there is a normative distinction between choice and constraint
(Le Grand, 1991) in a way that there is not between one type of constraint and
another.
Fourth, the capability approach emphasises the multidimensional nature of
poverty analysis, with a broader remit than focussing solely on ‘material’ poverty.
There is, at present, a tension between a desire to reflect the multidimensionality
of poverty (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2002: 79) and an insistence on preserving the
relationship between resources and the concept of poverty (e.g. Nolan and
Whelan, 1996). A broader focus is required because some of the most vulnerable
members of society experience circumstances that may not immediately be due
to a lack of resources: homeless people, drug and alcohol addicts, functional
illiterates and those who have suffered physical or mental abuse (Volkert, 2006),
for example.
It is sometimes suggested, however, that a resource-based approach can act
as a proxy for multidimensional deprivation since resources are an all-purpose
means (Rawls, 1971). But, as we have noted, research examining the relationship
between indirect and direct measures of poverty has consistently emphasised
that they identify different people as being in poverty (e.g. Bradshaw and Finch,
2003).
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Fifth, the capability approach offers a way to reconcile the tension between
narrow and broad approaches to poverty by respecting the former, while not losing
sight of the latter. Lister (2004: 18) has argued that to conceive of poverty as
capability-failure is to conflate poverty with an altogether broader notion such
as quality of life or well-being, because not all ‘ill-being’ is related to a lack of
resources.
The ‘normative focus’ of the capability approach seeks to identify the
‘informational space’ of analysis and is more concerned with delimiting this
normative terrain than with deciding whether and/or how this terrain may be
subdivided into constituent concepts. Thus, ‘poverty’ could retain its narrower
meaning, with a lack of resources at its core, if the essential additional terrain
stressed by the capability approach were taken up by the concept of (multiple)
deprivation. Thus, we can concede Lister’s critique, but in a way which emphasises
the normative inseparability of the concepts of poverty and deprivation.
Sixth, a capability framework for poverty analysis would draw both on
the capability approach and existing poverty analysis within social policy. The
contribution of the capability approach is its normative focus – in prioritising
capabilities (ends) over resources (means), in adopting a multidimensional
perspective and taking a broad view of the constraints that restrict human lives.
But the specific dimensionality of such a capability framework would be decided
contextually with reference, inter alia, to the existing literature on poverty analysis
within social policy.
The ways in which lives may be blighted by poverty and deprivation are
many, and those who seek to tackle these twin evils require an analytic framework
built on steady foundations. In focussing on intrinsically important capability
deprivations rather than some convenient proxy such as income, the capability
approach can provide such foundations, not only to understand poverty and
deprivation – but also to combat them.
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